The idea, insofar as it represents something, is said to have an objective reality. Still from the terminological point of view, it's quite useful to know that since the Middle Ages this aspect of the idea has been termed its “objective reality.” In texts from the 17th century and earlier, when you encounter the objective reality of the idea this always means the idea envisioned as representation of something. For example, the idea of a triangle is the mode of thought which represents the triangle. What is called an idea, in the sense in which everyone has always taken it in the history of philosophy, is a mode of thought which represents something. Some translators translate affectio as “affection” and affectus as “feeling”, which is better than translating both by the same word, but I don't see the necessity of having recourse to the word “feeling” since French offers the word “affect.” Thus when I use the word “affect” it refers to Spinoza's affectus, and when I say the word “affection,” it refers to affectio.įirst point: what is an idea? What must an idea be, in order for us to comprehend even Spinoza's simplest propositions? On this point Spinoza is not original, he is going to take the word “idea” in the sense in which everyone has always taken it. They translate both terms, affectio and affectus, by “affection.” I call this a disaster because when a philosopher employs two words, it's because in principle he has reason to, especially when French easily gives us two words which correspond rigorously to affectio and affectus, that is “affection” for affectio and “affect” for affectus. Some translators, quite strangely, translate both in the same way. In Spinoza's principal book, which is called the Ethics and which is written in Latin, one finds two words: AFFECTIO and AFFECTUS. I begin with some terminological cautions. It matters little whether you've read him or not, for I'm telling a story. I believe that, of all the philosophers of whom the history of philosophy speaks to us, Spinoza is in a quite exceptional situation: the way he touches those who enter into his books has no equivalent. I assume that the room is relatively mixed. I will begin chiefly with terminological remarks. After all, a philosopher is not only someone who invents notions, he also perhaps invents ways of perceiving. I would almost like for you to take this bit of history of philosophy as a history tout court. During March, at the request of some of you, we will also take a break to consider the problem of synthesis and the problem of time in Kant.įor me, this produces a curious effect of returning to history. This very precise point concerns the following: what is an idea and what is an affect in Spinoza? Idea and affect in Spinoza. It's like a break, at the request of some of you. One component of affect, affectus, is also a mode.Today we pause in our work on continuous variation to return temporarily, for one session, to the history of philosophy, on a very precise point. This is a vital starting point for Deleuze: the idea is a mode of thought which represents something in its objective description. If I possess the idea of a table, such a possession remains the consequence of some experience with the object-oriented force of what we tend to call a table, and if I need to express the presence of this object in its absence, I will refer to it using such a term: in this sense, language, made of the substance of representation, superseding that which is lacking. First, an idea is a representational mode of thought in that it represents the objective world. Although it diverges from idea (a representational mode of thought), affect is deeply entrenched within it. Understanding Deleuze, Understanding ModernismĪffect denotes a nonrepresentational mode of thought and is divided into two subterms: affectio (affection) and affectus (affect).
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